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RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I. MONTANA CANNABIS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION V. STATE1
In Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State, the Montana Supreme Court held the rational basis test applies when reviewing portions of
the Montana Marijuana Act (“MMA”),2 codified at Montana Code Annotated §§ 50–46–308(3), (4), (6)(a), and (6)(b).3 The Court examined
whether the MMA infringed upon three fundamental rights found in the
Montana Constitution: the right to employment; the right to seek health; and
the right to privacy.4 The Court concluded the statutory provisions did not
implicate any of the fundamental rights at issue and the district court incorrectly applied strict scrutiny review to the MMA.5 This case answers important constitutional questions about medical marijuana at a time when
Montana courts are just beginning to sort through the legal implications of
the controversial and relatively new law.
In 2004, Montana voters passed Initiative 148 (the “Initiative”).6 The
Initiative was codified as the Medical Marijuana Act and authorized limited
use of medical marijuana.7 Over the next seven years, Montana experienced a rapid increase in medical marijuana providers and patients.8 In
response to the increase, the 2011 Legislature repealed the Initiative and
replaced it with the MMA.9 The MMA placed tighter restrictions on the
1.
2012).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n. v. State, 286 P.3d 1161 (Mont. 2012), reh’g denied (Oct. 23,
Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–301 (2011).
Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1168.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166–1168.
Id. at 1163.
Id.
Id.
Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1163.
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cultivation and distribution of medical marijuana compared to what was
previously allowed under the Initiative.10 On May 13, 2011, a group of
plaintiffs, including the Montana Cannabis Industry Association, filed suit
seeking to enjoin implementation of the MMA.11
The district court issued a preliminary injunction on June 30, 2011,
enjoining several sections of the MMA.12 The district court found the
MMA violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to pursue employment,
seek health care, and privacy.13 Using a strict scrutiny analysis because
fundamental rights were at issue, the district court reasoned the plaintiffs
would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.14
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court only analyzed portions of the
MMA, including §§ 50–46–308(3), (4), (6)(a), and (6)(b).15 Section
50–46–308(3) limits the number of patients a provider may assist to three
(two if the provider is also a patient), while §§ 50–46–308(4), (6)(a), and
(6)(b) prevent providers from accepting any reimbursement or value in exchange for marijuana, with the exception of reimbursement for the provider’s registry identification card application or renewal fee.16
The Court began its analysis by determining the proper level of scrutiny for each right implicated in the Montana Constitution.17 Laws affecting fundamental constitutional rights (rights found in the Declaration of
Rights) are evaluated under strict scrutiny.18 Laws affecting rights found
elsewhere in the Montana Constitution (but not in the Declaration of
Rights) are evaluated under middle-tier scrutiny.19 Remaining laws are
evaluated under the rational basis test.20
Looking first at the right to employment, the Court noted Article II,
section 3 implies a fundamental right to employment because “it is a right
without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little
meaning.”21 The Court then pointed out two significant limitations on the
right.22 First, it does not include the right to a specific form of employ10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1163–1164.
13. Id. at 1164.
14. Id.
15. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1164.
16. Id. at 1163–1164.
17. Id. at 1165.
18. Id. (citing Snetsinger v. Mont. U. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 450 (Mont. 2004)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1165 (citing Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165,
1171–1172 (Mont. 1996)).
22. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1165–1166.
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ment.23 Second, it does not grant individuals the right to employment in
violation of the State’s police power.24 As a result, the Court held the
MMA does not implicate the fundamental right to employment.25
Moving on, the Court pointed out that similar to employment, the right
to seek health is subject to the State’s police power.26 The right to seek
health is an enumerated fundamental right; however, the text of the Constitution specifically limits the right to “all lawful ways.”27 The Court firmly
concluded the right to health “does not extend to give a patient a fundamental right to use any drug, regardless of its legality.”28
Finally, the Court examined the right to privacy. The Court distinguished the purported privacy right to use medical marijuana from the privacy right in Armstrong v. State,29 noting the privacy right implicated in
Armstrong (the right to have an abortion) is constitutionally protected at
both the state and federal level.30 The Court recognized the affirmative
right to access a particular drug is not protected under the right to privacy in
Montana or in any other jurisdiction.31 The Court concluded by explicitly
stating the Legislature was acting within its authority when it replaced the
Initiative with the MMA.32
After deciding the district court erred in finding the MMA implicates
the above-mentioned fundamental rights, the Court remanded with instructions to apply rational basis review to §§ 50–46–308(3), (4), (6)(a), and
(6)(b).33 The Court pointed out “the new medical marijuana framework
does not suddenly raise the affirmative right to access a particular drug to a
fundamental right protected by our Constitution.”34 The Court also added,
“Plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that they have a fundamental right to
medical marijuana when it is still unequivocally illegal under the [federal]
Controlled Substances Act.”35
23. Id. (citing Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1173).
24. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1165–1166 (citing Wiser v. State, 129 P.3d 133, 139
(Mont. 2006)).
25. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1166.
26. Id. (citing Wiser, 129 P.3d at 139).
27. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1166; Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
28. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1166.
29. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
30. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1167.
31. Id. (citing Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 710 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
32. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1168.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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In a lone dissent, Justice Nelson stated the issue did not present a justiciable controversy because of federal preemption.36 He reasoned that since
actions legalized by the MMA are still unequivocally illegal under federal
law, the Court’s ruling is “purely academic,” and even if the Court had
decided in favor of the plaintiffs, it would be “meaningless because their
activities are illegal regardless.”37 Justice Nelson firmly concluded Montana courts “should not be required to devote any more time trying to interpret and finesse” the MMA because of preemption issues.38 Yet, he recognized a permissible exception would occur in cases where the State has
instituted a civil or criminal action against an individual and the MMA
would provide an affirmative defense.39 Had the case been justiciable, Justice Nelson stated he would have disagreed with the Court’s analysis of the
fundamental rights at issue.40 He criticized the Court for not using strict
scrutiny review and for suggesting fundamental rights could be limited by
the State’s police power.41
Montana Cannabis Industry Association rejects the argument that
medical marijuana implicates the fundamental rights of employment,
health, and privacy. It also establishes rational basis as the standard of review for provisions of the MMA. Rational basis review is the easiest constitutional hurdle for legislative acts to jump, as statutes need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.42 Based on this decision, the Legislature has great latitude to regulate medical marijuana, and
patients and providers receive no special constitutional protections. Montana attorneys should be aware of the Legislature’s seemingly broad authority to regulate this controversial drug and the possibility that more regulations are on the horizon.
—Trevor Carlson
II.

IN

RE

ESTATE

OF

AFRANK43

In In re Estate of Afrank, the Montana Supreme Court established, as a
matter of first impression, that indebtedness encumbering property held by
joint tenants with right of survivorship is not exonerated upon the death of
36.
ted).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1168–1170 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citations omitId. at 1169–1171 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1172–1173.
Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n., 286 P.3d at 1165 (majority) (citing Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 450).
In re Est. of Afrank, 291 P.3d 576 (Mont. 2012).
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one of the joint tenants.44 The Court overruled the district court’s45 application of the common-law rule and instead applied the nonexoneration provision of Montana’s Uniform Probate Code,46 which provides that “[a] specific devise passes subject to any security interest existing at the date of
death, without right of exoneration, regardless of a general directive in the
will to pay debts.”47
In June 2009, Dennis Afrank died of injuries sustained in an accident.48 At that time, he and his wife Deborah owned a motor home as joint
tenants with right of survivorship.49 The motor home was subject to a
$124,000 debt, for which the Afranks were jointly and severally liable.50
After Dennis’s death, Deborah filed a claim against the Estate for half of the
amount of the loan.51 Leslie Afrank, the Personal Representative and Dennis’s daughter from a previous marriage, denied the claim.52 Consequently,
Deborah filed a claim in district court.53
Applying what it deemed to be the “better-reasoned” common-law majority rule from other states, the district court held the Estate had an equitable duty to pay its share of debts on all jointly-held property, including the
motor home.54 Under the common-law approach, absent exigent circumstances, the decedent’s estate has “[a]n equitable duty to pay its aliquot
share of debts on jointly-held property held by the decedent’s spouse and
the decedent at death.”55 Subsequently, the Personal Representative appealed.56
When an equitable decision comes before the Montana Supreme
Court, it determines “whether the findings of fact are clearly erroneous and
whether the conclusions of law are correct.”57 In the instant case, the Court
reversed the district court and decided it should not have allowed Deborah’s
claim against her deceased husband’s estate for one-half of the loan amount
on the motor home.58
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 72–2–617 (2011)).
Mont. Code Ann. § 72–2–617.
In re Est. of Afrank, 291 P.3d at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Est. of Afrank, 291 P.3d at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court first acknowledged that, because Dennis and Deborah held
the motor home as joint tenants with right of survivorship, Dennis’s interest
in the motor home automatically passed to Deborah upon Dennis’s death.59
It did not pass to Deborah under Dennis’s will.60
The Court then looked to Montana statutes to find the applicable policy regarding the reconciliation of debt encumbering non-probate property.
Citing Montana Code Annotated § 72–2–617, a provision of Montana’s
Uniform Probate Code, the Court noted that Montana has a public policy
favoring the nonexoneration of debts.61 The Court reasoned that, had Dennis specifically devised the motor home to Deborah by will, Deborah would
have received the motor home subject to the entire debt.62
Both Deborah and the lower court relied on an American Law Report
annotation from 196163 that proffered a surviving spouse’s right to exoneration.64 The Court, however, dismissed this notion because it predated Montana’s adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.65
In re Estate of Afrank determined that a surviving joint tenant, who is
jointly and severally liable on a debt encumbering property held in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship, takes the property subject to the entire
amount of the indebtedness. By operation of the common law governing
property held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, and supported by
public policy, the Court held the surviving joint tenant is not exonerated
from the decedent’s half of any debt.66
—Michel Fullerton
III.

MALPELI V. STATE67

In Malpeli v. State, the Montana Supreme Court examined the scope of
the Montana Department of Transportation’s (“MDT”) duty to provide reasonable access to property as part of an inverse condemnation action
brought after an MDT highway safety improvement project.68 Though a
jury concluded MDT had not taken a property right, the Court held, as a
59. Id. at 577–578.
60. In re Est. of Afrank, 291 P.3d at 578.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Marvel, C.C., Right of Surviving Spouse to Contribution, Exoneration, or Other Reimbursement
out of Decedent’s Estate Respecting Liens on Estate by Entirety or Joint Tenancy, 76 A.L.R. 2d 1004
(West 1961).
64. In re Est. of Afrank, 291 P.3d at 578.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Malpeli v. State, 285 P.3d 509 (Mont. 2012).
68. Id. at 510.
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matter of law, that Faith Malpeli’s use of a public right-of-way to turn vehicles around did not create a compensable property interest.69 The Court
thus affirmed the judgment for MDT after concluding the district court
should have granted summary judgment in favor of MDT.70
MDT widened a portion of Highway 191 in the summer and fall of
2008 and 2009 as part of a highway safety improvement project.71 The
project included the addition of a left-turn lane and eight-foot-wide paved
shoulders.72 Faith Malpeli’s (“Malpeli”) residence lies adjacent to the reconstructed portion of the road.73 The entire project stayed within the existing right-of-way, and the widening of the road did not encroach onto
Malpeli’s property.74 However, after the improvements, Malpeli’s garage
was only one foot from the edge of the right-of-way.75 Additionally,
Malpeli could no longer turn vehicles around without backing directly onto
the highway or the paved shoulder.76
Malpeli filed an inverse condemnation action against MDT in January
2010.77 She alleged that MDT took “reasonable and safe access to her residential property to and from Highway 191” and “violated its own ‘approach
standards’ in the reconstruction of the highway.”78 Malpeli argued that
MDT took her right to reasonably access her property because she could no
longer maneuver her vehicles around before entering Highway 191.79
MDT filed a motion for summary judgment following discovery, arguing that “Malpeli did not have a property interest in the use of the public
right-of-way for maneuvering vehicles, and using the public right-of-way in
such a manner was unrelated to any right of access that a landowner might
possess.”80 The district court denied MDT’s motion, concluding that
Malpeli had a right of “reasonable ingress and egress” to and from her property and that the question of whether the project constituted a taking of this
property right was one of fact for a jury.81
After a jury found MDT had “not taken a property right belonging to
Malpeli,” she appealed on claims of trial error.82 MDT filed a cross-appeal,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id. at 510–511.
Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 510.
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510–511.
Id. at 511.
Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510.
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arguing the district court erred “by denying its motion for partial summary
judgment before trial.”83 The Montana Supreme Court, affirming the judgment in favor of MDT, concluded that the district court should have granted
the motion for summary judgment.84 As such, the Court did not address
Malpeli’s claims of trial error.85
In support of its holding, the Court began by noting that in order for an
inverse condemnation claim to stand, there must be a protected property
interest.86 Thus, the Court summarized the issue as whether “Malpeli had a
compensable property interest in the use of the public’s right-of-way to turn
her vehicles around.”87 The Court disagreed with the district court’s reliance on State ex. rel. State Highway Commission v. Keneally88 for the proposition that whether MDT took Malpeli’s property interest was a question
of fact for the jury. Rather, the Court distinguished Keneally, noting the
parties in this case disputed whether a compensable property right even
existed.89
The Court looked to regulations adopted by MDT governing access to
highways in determining the extent of property interests to which Malpeli
was entitled.90 Through these regulations, MDT seeks to balance the adjacent landowner’s reasonable and safe access to the highway with the safety
and utility of the highway.91 The regulations provide abutting landowners
with instructions for obtaining a permit when constructing approaches similar to Malpeli’s driveway, including design specifications.92 The design
specifications require “sufficient storage area off the highway right-of-way”
that is “provided by the landowner . . . to prevent a vehicle from backing
out of an approach onto the traveled way.”93 The regulations suggest a
setback of at least 15 feet but recommend a larger distance where the free
movement of large vehicles is anticipated, particularly in rural areas.94
However, Malpeli never applied for an approach permit.95 The Court found
that these provisions clearly dictate that it is the landowner’s responsibility
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 510.
86. Id. at 511–512.
87. Id. at 512.
88. State ex. rel. State Hwy. Commn. v. Keneally, 384 P.2d 770 (Mont. 1963).
89. Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 512. In Keneally, the parties recognized a right for adjacent landowners to
“reasonable ingress and egress from the abutting highway” and essentially stipulated a compensable
property right existed. Id. (citing Keneally, 384 P.2d at 772).
90. Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 513.
91. Id. (citing Admin. R. Mont. 18.5.101(1), (2) (2012)).
92. Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 513.
93. Id. (citing Admin. R. Mont. 18.5.112(9)(b)).
94. Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 513 (citing Admin. R. Mont. 18.5.112(9)(a)).
95. Malpeli, 285 P.3d at 513.
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to provide the room to maneuver vehicles on their own property and not on
the right-of-way.96
The Court rejected Malpeli’s claim that she was entitled to safe and
reasonable access, not just basic access, noting Malpeli provided no authority to support her position.97 The Court pointed to her failure to provide
sufficient space on her property prior to her special use of the right-of-way
in determining her use did not establish a compensable property interest.98
While her approach was less safe than before the reconstruction project, the
undisputed facts established it was not due to the expansion project but
rather the lack of adequate space between the garage on Malpeli’s property
and the right-of-way.99
Montana practitioners should note that it is the landowner’s responsibility to provide enough room off of a right-of-way to maneuver vehicles.
Prior use of a right-of-way in this manner does not establish a compensable
property interest, even if such use is necessary to safely maneuver vehicles
to and from the adjacent property. While Malpeli did not acquire an approach permit, the Court suggested that having a permit or license of such a
nature would still not create a compensable property interest.100
—Pamela Garman
IV.

BROOKINS V. MOTE101

In Brookins v. Mote, the Montana Supreme Court clarified the circumstances in which a hospital may be sued under consumer protection laws
and recognized negligent credentialing as a new cause of action in Montana.102 The Court held that Montana’s Consumer Protection Act103 can be
used against hospitals only with respect to the entrepreneurial aspects of
their operations, which does not include credentialing.104 Recognizing negligent credentialing as a new and valid tort, the Court enumerated its elements, which require a plaintiff to establish the standard of care, demonstrate a deviation from that standard, and show resultant damages.105
Dr. Frederick Mote, an obstetrician, moved from Oregon to Superior,
Montana in 1992 to work at Mineral Community Hospital (the “Hospi96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id. at 514–515.
Id. at 514.
Brookins v. Mote, 292 P.3d 347 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 359–361.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–101 (2011).
Brookins, 292 P.3d at 360.
Id. at 361.
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tal”).106 Dr. Mote’s work was cut short when he returned to Oregon in
April of 1992 to answer charges of sexual abuse of a minor and endangering the welfare of a minor.107 Dr. Mote subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor sexual abuse of a child and attended a rehabilitation facility specializing in sexual addiction.108
In September 1992, Dr. Mote returned to Superior after entering into
an agreement with the Montana Board of Medical Examiners that allowed
him to retain his license but subjected him to a probationary period and
restricted his ability to treat minor patients.109 After the Hospital decided
not to rehire him, Dr. Mote opened a private practice in his home but secured credentials from the Hospital allowing use of its facility as an independent physician.110
Upon his return to Superior, Ann Brookins hired Dr. Mote as her obstetrician when she was four months pregnant.111 In February 1993, Dr.
Mote delivered Brookins’s son at the Hospital.112 During the birth, complications arose that may have resulted in developmental problems for the
baby, who has since been diagnosed with brain damage.113
In 2005, Brookins sued both Dr. Mote and the Hospital.114 Against
Dr. Mote, Brookins claimed malpractice, unauthorized sexual contact with
the baby, and assault and battery for unnecessary pelvic exams.115 Against
the Hospital, Brookins alleged vicarious liability for Dr. Mote, direct liability pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act, and negligence based on the
credentialing process the hospital used to approve Dr. Mote’s use of its
facility.116 Brookins settled her claims against Dr. Mote, who was dismissed from the suit in 2007.117 Following discovery, Brookins and the
Hospital both moved for summary judgment, which the district court
granted to the Hospital on all claims.118 Subsequently, Brookins appealed.119
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
actually
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brookins, 292 P.3d at 351.
Id.
Id. (the published opinion states here that he was born in 1992, but elsewhere indicates it was
1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brookins, 292 P.3d at 351.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id.
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The most notable holding from Brookins involves Brookins’s claim for
negligent credentialing under Montana’s Consumer Protection Act
(“CPA”).120 The CPA states: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
unlawful.”121 The Court discussed the historical debate that has surrounded
the interplay of consumer protection legislation and the practice of
medicine, noting the profession of medicine has traditionally been exempt
from such laws because it does not directly deal with trade and commerce.122 Rather, the Court noted that the traditional purpose of the practice of medicine is providing necessary services, not realizing profit.123
Ultimately, the Court looked to other jurisdictions in deciding that
while there is no blanket exemption for hospital liability under consumer
protection laws, there is liability for those activities relating to the business
aspects of hospital practices, as opposed to the “actual practice” of
medicine.124 The Court held that the credentialing practices of the Hospital
had nothing to do with the entrepreneurial aspects of the Hospital’s business
and, as such, affirmed summary judgment regarding the CPA claim.125
Though the Court rejected Brookins’s CPA claim, it recognized a common law claim for negligent credentialing.126 This “new” tort is a form of
professional negligence not previously recognized in Montana.127
The Court surveyed both Montana case law and sister jurisdictions to
determine if the gradual evolution of the common law supported recognizing negligent credentialing as a valid cause of action in Montana.128 Citing
Hull v. North Valley Hospital,129 the Court explained that hospitals already
have a duty to ensure patient safety when accrediting physicians and granting privileges.130 Noting that at least 30 other states recognize the tort of
negligent credentialing, the Court concluded the evolution of common law
supports the adoption of negligent credentialing as a valid cause of action in
Montana.131 The Court then established the elements of negligent credentialing that a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the applicable standard of care; (2)
the defendant departed from that standard of care; and (3) the departure
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 357.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–103.
Brookins, 292 P.3d at 358.
Id. (citing Nelson v. Ho, 564 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Mich. App. 1997)).
Brookins, 292 P.3d at 359–360.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 359–360.
Id. at 360 (citing Saaco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 426 (Mont. 1995)).
Hull v. N. Valley Hosp., 498 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1972).
Brookins, 292 P.3d at 360 (citing Hull, 498 P.2d at 140).
Brookins, 292 P.3d at 361.
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proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.”132 Since the process of physician
credentialing is complicated, the Court held that expert testimony is required to establish the applicable standard of care as well as a deviation
from that standard.133
Addressing the case at hand, the Court held that while Brookins’s proffered expert established the standard of care applicable to the Hospital’s
credentialing protocols, he did not demonstrate that the standard was
breached.134 As such, the Court held that the district court correctly granted
summary judgment to the Hospital on the negligent credentialing claim.135
The Montana practitioner should be aware of Brookins because it clarifies the manner in which the CPA may be used by plaintiffs against health
care providers. Further, Brookins is notable because the Court recognized
the tort of negligent credentialing and held that expert testimony is required
to demonstrate both the standard of care owed by hospitals in credentialing
as well as any deviation from that standard.
—Dylan Jensen
V.

BRIESE V. MONTANA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT BOARD136

In Briese v. Montana Public Employees’ Retirement Board, the Montana Supreme Court held, as a matter of first impression, that a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) prohibiting parties to a marriage dissolution from
changing beneficiaries for insurance or other benefit plans includes a beneficiary change for survivorship benefits under the Montana Sheriff’s Retirement System (“SRS”).137 In reaching this conclusion, the Court avoided
establishing a bright-line rule rendering any beneficiary change in violation
of such TROs automatically void, but it held that equitable powers may
provide for “a return to the status quo when a party violating a [TRO] has
died.”138
David Briese, a deputy sheriff for Yellowstone County and a member
of the SRS, designated his wife, Erene Briese, as his primary beneficiary in
2001.139 In 2004, David filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and,
pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 40–4–121,140 the dissolution court
132. Id. (citing Est. of Willson v. Adison, 258 P.3d 410, 414 (Mont. 2011)).
133. Brookins, 292 P.3d at 362.
134. Id. at 362–363.
135. Id. at 364.
136. Briese v. Mont. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Bd., 285 P.3d 550 (Mont. 2012).
137. Id. at 555.
138. Id. at 558–559 (footnote omitted).
139. Briese, 285 P.3d at 552–553.
140. Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–121 (2011) (controlling temporary orders for maintenance or support,
temporary injunctions, and temporary restraining orders during marriage dissolution proceedings).
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issued a TRO prohibiting the couple from “changing the beneficiaries of
‘insurance or other coverage . . . held for the benefit of a party.’”141 However, in August 2006, David replaced Erene as beneficiary, designating
their two minor children in her stead.142 In November 2006, David was
killed in the line of duty.143
Erene learned of the changed SRS beneficiary designation in early
2008 and informed the Montana Public Employees’ Retirement Administration (“MPERA”) that the 2006 change violated the TRO.144 MPERA responded that it was bound by statute to honor the 2006 change and instructed Erene to choose a payment option on behalf of the children.145
Erene then submitted forms to activate monthly payments.146 In 2009, Erene realized that payments to the children resulted in adverse tax consequences, so she again requested that MPERA recognize David’s 2001 designation of herself as beneficiary, was again denied, and was denied yet
again on appeal to the Montana Public Employees’ Retirement Board
(“MPERB”).147 In December 2009, Erene requested a formal review of
MPERB’s decision under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act,148
which resulted in a final order that:
(1) Erene waived her right to contest the validity of the 2006 beneficiary
designation when she applied for benefits on behalf of her children; (2) the
issue was moot because, once benefits were granted to her children, the parties could not be restored to their original positions; and (3) the [TRO] in the
dissolution proceedings was not applicable to an SRS beneficiary designation.149

Erene then sought review in the First Judicial District Court, which, without
addressing either the waiver or mootness arguments, affirmed the final order, finding the TRO inapplicable to David’s designation of SRS beneficiaries.150 Erene appealed.
The Montana Supreme Court began by addressing whether application
for and acceptance of benefits on behalf of the children mooted or waived
Erene’s right to challenge the beneficiary designation.151 MPERB argued
141. Briese, 285 P.3d at 553 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–121(3)).
142. Briese, 285 P.3d at 553.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2–4–101 to 2–4–711 (providing, inter alia, guidance and standards with
respect to agency rulemaking, contested cases, and judicial review of agency rules and final agency
decisions).
149. Briese, 285 P.3d at 553.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 553–554.
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that under § 19–2–803,152 once payments commenced, it had fulfilled its
statutory obligations.153 However, the Court explained § 19–2–803 was
not applicable because, when read as a whole, its intent was to protect
“MPERB from a minor’s direct claims for additional payments after proper
payment had already been made to a surviving parent or other designated
recipient”; it neither rendered Erene’s claim moot nor prevented the Court
from granting relief.154 Because Erene had elected monthly payments
rather than a lump sum, the Court held that effective relief could be granted
by issuing future monthly payments to her rather than the children.155 Rejecting MPERB’s waiver argument, the Court explained, “Waiver is the
voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, and must be
manifested in some unequivocal manner.”156 Noting that MPERA did not
inform Erene of her due process right to appeal its decision to MPERB until
July 2009, more than a year after insisting she choose a payment option, the
Court concluded that Erene’s application for and acceptance of benefits in
order to support the children was not a voluntary and intentional waiver of
her claim.157
Having rejected MPERB’s mootness and waiver arguments, the Court
moved on to address the merits of Erene’s claim. As MPERB was unaware
of the dissolution proceedings, the Court acknowledged that MPERB had
no reason to question David’s 2006 change of beneficiaries.158 The Court
further confirmed that § 19–2–801159 allows members of public employee
benefit plans the option to revoke former beneficiaries and to make new
designations and also provides “the most recent [designation] is effective
for all purposes.” However, the Court noted this option was available
“‘[u]nless otherwise provided by statute.’”160 In returning to the scope of
§ 40–4–121(3) and pointing to its broad and expansive language, the Court
held that this statute did apply to a change in beneficiary status for an SRS
account.161 The Court buttressed its holding by applying the ejusdem
generis doctrine of statutory construction, which means that if a list of specific things precedes a general word or phrase, the general word or phrase is
152. Mont. Code Ann. § 19–2–803 (controlling payments to custodians of minor beneficiaries).
153. Briese, 285 P.3d at 554.
154. Id. (emphasis in original).
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Tvedt v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 91 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2004)).
157. Briese, 285 P.3d at 554–555 (referencing Admin. R. Mont. 2.43.1501(2) (2003); Pickens v.
Shelton-Thompson, 3 P.3d 608 (Mont. 2000)).
158. Briese, 285 P.3d at 555.
159. Mont. Code Ann. § 19–2–801 (controlling designation of beneficiaries under public employees’ retirement plans).
160. Briese, 285 P.3d at 555 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 19–2–801).
161. Briese, 285 P.3d at 556.
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confined to those things “similar in nature” to those in the list.162 The
Court observed that David’s SRS plan paid benefits to a beneficiary designated by the member upon the member’s death, was “‘similar in nature’ to
life insurance,”163 and was therefore included within § 40–4–121(3) and the
dissolution court’s TRO.164
The Court rejected MPERB’s argument that the TRO was too vague
by again citing § 40–4–121(3) for its prohibition of “any change of beneficiaries for ‘any . . . coverage . . . held for the benefit of a party’” and by
noting that David’s 2001 designation of Erene as beneficiary rendered the
account “for the benefit” of Erene.165 The Court conceded that MPERB
was not a party to or directly restrained from particular acts under the TRO,
but the Court explained that this was not the issue.166 Rather, David’s 2006
designation violated the “statutorily-mandated” TRO to which he was a
bound party, thereby violating § 19–2–801(2).167 Rejecting MPERB’s public policy and legislative intent arguments, the Court responded that
MPERB’s two principal referenced cases were inapplicable as neither involved a TRO or interpretation of § 40–4–121(3). Rather, the first involved
a surviving spouse’s claim who had never been designated a beneficiary,
and the second did not involve a beneficiary’s claim for death benefits but
instead involved the division of retirement benefits under a marriage dissolution decree.168
The Court next addressed a question of first impression: should
David’s violation of the TRO automatically void the beneficiary change?169
Although the remedy would normally target the violator, “[s]uch a remedy,
however, is ‘no remedy at all in this context; it evaporates [with the death of
the violator] the instant it is needed.’”170 Looking to other jurisdictions, the
Court found support for automatically voiding the change,171 but it also
found courts preferring to apply equitable powers to grant relief.172 The
162. Id. (citing Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 215 P.3d 675 (Mont. 2009) (quoting Cir. City Stores v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–115 (2001))).
163. Life insurance is among the list of specific types of coverage included under § 40–4–121(3).
164. Briese, 285 P.3d at 556.
165. Id. at 557 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–121(3)(b)).
166. Id. at 557.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 558 (citing Sowell v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Mont., 693 P.2d 1222 (Mont. 1984); State ex
rel. Neuhausen v. Nachtsheim, 833 P.2d 201 (Mont. 1992)).
169. Briese, 285 P.3d at 558.
170. Id. (quoting Aither v. Est. of Aither, 913 A.2d 376, 380 (Vt. 2006)).
171. Briese, 285 P.3d at 558–559 (citing Webb v. Webb, 134 N.W.2d 673, 674–675 (Mich. 1965);
N.W. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hahn, 713 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Iowa App. 2006); Aither, 913 A.2d at 381;
Stand. Ins. Co. v. Schwalbe, 755 P.2d 802, 806 (Wash. 1988)).
172. Briese, 285 P.3d at 559 (citing Valley Forge Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1308–1309 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 331 F.2d 346, 349–351 (5th Cir.
1964); Am. Fam. Life Ins. Co. v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2d 921, 923–924 (Minn. App. 1995)).
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Court sided with those jurisdictions applying equitable powers to return to
the pre-violation status quo when the violator has died.173 As such, the
Court reversed and remanded for an entry of judgment declaring David’s
2006 beneficiary change invalid and ordered Erene reinstated as designee.174 In choosing to apply equitable powers, the Court noted that “Erene
is not asking MPERB to pay twice, nor is she asking for a recipient who
was wrongfully paid benefits to return them.”175
Montana practitioners representing parties to a marriage dissolution or
representing administrators of benefit plans should take heed of the Court’s
willingness to extend the reach of a TRO issued under dissolution proceedings and be aware of the Court’s standard in deciding the types of property
and interests included under § 40–4–121(3). In order to avoid administrative and litigation costs, administrators of benefit plans may wish to condition beneficiary designation changes upon disclosure of any TRO issued
under a marriage dissolution or similar proceeding.
—Quinton King
VI.

AMERICAN ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY V. MONTANA THIRTEENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT176

In American Zurich Insurance Company v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, the Montana Supreme Court held, as a matter of first
impression, that in a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, attorneyclient privilege and work product protection are waived when an attorney’s
communication to his client insurer is voluntarily disclosed to the non-client
employer.177 The Court held that the employer in the underlying workers’
compensation claim did not have sufficient shared legal interest with its
workers’ compensation insurer for attorney-client privilege to extend to the
employer.178 It similarly held that the lack of shared legal interest made it
unreasonable for the insurer to expect the employer to keep communications from the insurer to the employer confidential.179
Phillip Peters was injured on the job while working for Roscoe Steel &
Culvert Co. (“Roscoe”) and filed a workers’ compensation claim.180 Roscoe was insured by American Zurich under Plan II of the Montana Work173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Briese, 285 P.3d at 559.
Id.
Id. at 562 n. 3.
Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mont. Thirteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 280 P.3d 240 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 244, 248–249.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 243.
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ers’ Compensation Act.181 American Zurich outsourced the claims adjustment to Employee Benefit Management Solutions (“EBMS”).182 A claims
adjuster for EBMS, Jim Kimmel, had ultimate authority over resolution of
the claim.183 In the process of attempting to settle Peters’s workers’ compensation claim, disputes arose between Peters and American Zurich over
the extent of his impairment and other issues.184 Attorney Joe Maynard of
the Crowley Law Firm advised American Zurich on various legal issues
regarding Peters’s claim.185
In advance of a settlement conference, attorney Maynard prepared an
opinion letter for the adjuster, Kimmel.186 Upon receipt of the letter, Kimmel wrote various notes on it regarding a conversation with Maynard.187
Without the knowledge or permission of Maynard or anyone at American
Zurich, Kimmel provided a copy of the annotated letter to the employer,
Roscoe.188 The claim eventually settled, but Peters filed a subsequent
claim against Kimmel and American Zurich for unfair claim settlement
practices.189 Peters served Roscoe with a subpoena duces tecum requesting
all documents related to Peters’s employment and his workers’ compensation claim, including any correspondence between Roscoe and EBMS, Zurich, or the Crowley Law Firm.190 Roscoe moved to quash the subpoena
claiming attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.191
The Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County,
Gregory R. Todd, J., denied the motion and ordered Roscoe to produce the
letter.192 American Zurich then filed its own motion seeking relief from the
order to produce.193 The court denied American Zurich’s motion, and
American Zurich petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of super-

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 243.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240, 244.
Id. at 244.
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visory control.194 The Court held that, despite incorrect work product analysis, the district court reached the proper conclusion.195
The Court first looked at American Zurich’s contention that Maynard’s
letter was protected by attorney-client privilege. The privilege generally
extends only to communications between an attorney and a client.196 There
are circumstances, however, where communications to third parties are protected by the privilege.197 These circumstances—often characterized as
“joint defense agreements,” “joint prosecution privilege,” or the “common
interest doctrine”—occur when a third party has a common legal interest
with the client that brings communications between the attorney and the
third party under the attorney-client privilege.198 The Court noted workers’
compensation claims present unique circumstances for purposes of attorney-client privilege.199 While employers are required to cooperate and assist their insurers in workers’ compensation matters, with certain rare exceptions, the employer is statutorily immune from the personal injury
claims of its employees.200 Employers are not parties in workers’ compensation claims.201 For those reasons, the Court noted “[i]t is thus improper
for an insurer and an employer to collaborate on settlement of a worker’s
claim for benefits.”202 While the employer and the insurer share an interest
in keeping premiums and litigation costs to a minimum, those shared interests are insufficient to extend the attorney-client privilege beyond the attorney-client relationship.203 The Court noted “the relationship between an
insurer and insured is permeated with potential conflicts.”204 The Court
further noted that Kimmel’s disclosure of the letter to Roscoe was not nec194. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 244. Article VII, section 2(2) of the Montana Constitution
allows the Montana Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over other courts when “urgency or
emergency factors exist, making the normal appeals process inadequate, when the case involves purely
legal questions, and when . . . the other court is proceeding under a mistake of law and is causing a gross
injustice.” Id. (quoting Mont. R. App. P. 14(3)). The Court held that review of American Zurich’s
contentions was appropriate because “compelled discovery of potentially-privileged material presents
unique issues that, under certain circumstances, are sufficient to invoke original jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Inter Fluve v. Mont. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 112 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2005)). The Court found the
circumstances sufficient to invoke original jurisdiction because later appeal of the district court’s ruling
“would provide no relief for Zurich because the purportedly confidential contents of the letter would be
exposed.” Id.
195. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 244–245.
196. Id. at 245.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 245, 246.
201. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 246.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (quoting In re Rules of Prof. Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Conduct, 2
P.3d 806, 813 (Mont. 1999)).
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essary for American Zurich to obtain legal advice.205 Although Roscoe had
an obligation to provide information to American Zurich to assist the insurer in handling the workers’ compensation claim, that flow of information
was one-way.206 Because the law bars employers in Plan II from participating in the adjustment of the employee’s claim, the Court held it was neither
necessary nor appropriate for American Zurich to communicate its settlement strategy to Roscoe.207
The Court then looked at whether American Zurich waived attorneyclient privilege by sending the letter to Roscoe.208 Disclosure to third parties waives the privilege unless the disclosure is necessary for the client to
obtain informed legal advice.209 The Court held disclosure was not necessary for American Zurich to obtain legal advice.210 American Zurich argued, however, that Kimmel did not have authority to waive the privilege
because he was not an officer or a director of American Zurich, and the
privilege is normally only exercised or waived by officers and directors.211
The Court found this argument unpersuasive because, under Montana law,
claims adjusters have extensive authority when examining and managing
settlement claims.212 Kimmel himself admitted in his deposition that he
had “absolute authority” over Peters’s claim.213 Thus, the Court held that
Kimmel had authority to waive attorney-client privilege and his transmittal
of the letter to Roscoe constituted such waiver.214
The Court next looked at whether the work product doctrine protected
the letter from disclosure. The Court acknowledged that disclosure to nonadversaries does not necessarily waive confidentiality of attorney work
product.215 Disclosure to a non-adversary constitutes waiver if the recipient
is either a conduit to an adversary, or if there is no confidentiality agreement or other assurance that would give the disclosing party a reasonable
expectation the recipient would keep the work product confidential.216 The
Court held Roscoe’s overlapping relationship with both Peters and American Zurich made any expectation of confidentiality unreasonable.217 Thus,
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 246.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 280 P.3d at 249.
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the Court held disclosure of Maynard’s letter to Roscoe waived work product protection.218
The Court held the district court reached the correct conclusion that
production of the letter should be compelled despite the district court’s failure to fully analyze American Zurich’s work product argument.219 The
Court therefore dismissed the petition for writ of supervisory control.220
The Court’s holding makes clear that the relationship between a workers’
compensation insurer and the insured employer does not give rise to sufficient common legal interests between the two to extend either attorneyclient privilege or the work product doctrine to communications between
the insurer and the employer.
This case is significant to anyone practicing in the workers’ compensation field in Montana because it clarifies that communications to the employer from either the insurer or counsel for the insurer will not be protected from disclosure by either attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. In the wake of American Zurich, insurance defense attorneys
will want to caution adjusters and other insurance company representatives
not to share any communications between the attorney and the insurer with
the employer. Attorneys representing employees in workers’ compensation
matters will want to subpoena any communications from the insurer, or
counsel for the insurer, to the employer. The Court’s holding may also be
applicable to other contexts in which the insurer and insured do not have
significant shared legal interests. The Court was careful to note, however,
that its holding in American Zurich does not impact work product protection where an insurer and insured have a common legal interest in the underlying litigation.221
—Paul M. Leisher
VII.

CITY

OF

MISSOULA V. PAFFHAUSEN222

In City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, the Montana Supreme Court recognized, as a matter of first impression, involuntary intoxication as an affirmative “automatism”223 defense to the absolute liability offense of driving
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d 141 (Mont. 2012).
223. Automatism “refers to behavior performed in a state of unconsciousness or semi-consciousness
such that the behavior cannot be deemed volitional. This unconscious or semi-conscious state may be
brought about by any one of a variety of circumstances including epilepsy, stroke, concussion, or involuntary intoxication.” Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 148 (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
vol. 1, § 9.4(a), (b) (2d ed. 2003)).
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under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”).224 The Court held that Paffhausen
could assert automatism to challenge the voluntary act element of her DUI
charge because Montana’s voluntary act statute applies to all crimes, not
just those with a mental state element.225 In justifying its recognition of
automatism, the Court also relied on the existing defense of compulsion to
assert that under Montana law, “‘absolute liability’ is not necessarily absolute.”226
In the early morning hours of January 18, 2010, Missoula City Police
Officer Christian Cameron pulled over Leigh Paffhausen after observing
her drive through one stop sign and prematurely brake before another.227
After stopping Paffhausen, Officer Cameron noticed her speech was slow
and slurred.228 Officer Cameron was unable to administer a field sobriety
test, and Paffhausen refused to provide a breath sample.229 Officer Cameron subsequently arrested Paffhausen for DUI.230 After she was charged,
Paffhausen informed the Missoula Police Department that she believed
someone slipped her a “date rape” drug, which caused her impairment.231
At her initial appearance, Paffhausen filed notice that she intended to
assert involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense to the DUI
charge.232 The City of Missoula (the “City”) filed a motion before trial to
prevent Paffhausen from asserting involuntary intoxication, arguing that it
can only be used in cases where mental state is an element of the charged
crime.233 Paffhausen responded that she was not challenging the mental
state and was only asserting the defense to demonstrate that she did not
commit a voluntary act by driving.234 Paffhausen acknowledged consuming a small amount of alcohol the night of her arrest but insisted that she
should not be responsible for driving under the influence because she had
been unknowingly drugged by a third party.235 The Municipal Court sided
with the City and prevented Paffhausen from asserting an involuntary intoxication defense.236 Paffhausen appealed the ruling, first to the District
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 147–148.
Id. at 146, 148.
Id. at 146–148.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 144.
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Court, which affirmed the Municipal Court’s ruling, and then to the Montana Supreme Court.237
On appeal, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling and held that
Paffhausen could use the automatism defense to challenge the voluntary act
element of her DUI charge.238 In recognizing automatism, the Court noted
that State v. Korell239 provides that Montana’s statutory code leaves room
for an automatism defense, even without explicit judicial recognition.240 In
light of Korell, the Court examined Montana Code Annotated § 45–2–202,
which states that “[a] material element of every offense is a voluntary act,”
and § 45–2–101(33), which defines an involuntary act, in part, as “a bodily
movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of
the actor, either conscious or habitual.”241 The Court also quoted the Criminal Law Commission Comments to § 45–2–202, which state that “a muscular movement may be voluntary (‘willed’) or involuntary—a physical reflex or compelled motion which is not accompanied by the volition of the
person making the motion. Only the voluntary act gives rise to criminal
liability.”242
The Court provided policy reasons for recognizing the automatism defense and analogized it to the codified defense of compulsion.243 The Court
noted the automatism defense falls squarely in line with criminal law policy
as embodied in Montana’s statutes precluding the faulting of people for the
acts of others or for acts performed without criminal intent.244 Applying
this policy, the Court held that if Paffhausen could prove by admissible
evidence that she did not act voluntarily because a third party drugged her,
she may not be guilty of DUI.245 The Court further validated the automatism defense by comparing it to compulsion, which allows a defendant to
evade conviction for a crime despite conduct that fits the offense if the
defendant is in imminent danger and needs to escape from harm.246 The
Court relied on State v. Leprowse,247 which allowed a compulsion defense
in a DUI case, as precedent supporting the principle that “‘absolute liability’ does not necessarily mean absolute.”248
237. Id.
238. Id. at 149–150.
239. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984).
240. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 146 (citing Korell, 690 P.2d at 1001).
241. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 146 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–2–101(33), 45–2–202).
242. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 146 (quoting the Criminal Law Commission Comments to Mont. Code
Ann. § 45–2–202).
243. Paffhausen 289 P.3d at 146–147.
244. Id. at 147 (citing Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–1–102(1)(b), 1–3–211, 1–3–217).
245. Paffhausen 289 P.3d at 148.
246. Id. at 146–147.
247. State v. Leprowse, 221 P.3d 648 (Mont. 2009).
248. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 147 (citing Leprowse, 221 P.3d at 651).
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In his dissent, Justice Rice criticized the Court for contradicting the
Legislature’s intent by injecting a mental state element into an absolute liability offense.249 As evidence of this contradiction, Justice Rice looked to
the Annotator’s Notes to the Montana Criminal Code of 1973, which state
that the voluntary act statute should not apply to absolute liability offenses.250 Despite reorganization of the Montana Criminal Code in 1979,
no substantive changes were made to the voluntary act statute, and, according to Justice Rice, its application should continue to be consistent.251 He
pointed out that, until Paffhausen, the Court applied the voluntary act statute only to crimes having a mental state element and never to an absolute
liability crime.252
Justice Rice also disagreed with the Court’s rationale regarding compulsion as a basis upon which to justify automatism and warned that the
Court’s holding opened the door to frivolous voluntary act defenses.253 He
argued that the Court drew unwarranted similarities between compulsion
and involuntary intoxication, quoting the reasoning of New Mexico v.
Gurule,254 a case that compared involuntary intoxication to “duress.”255
Gurule recognized duress but disallowed involuntary intoxication on the
grounds that duress justifies an illegal act within the totality of the circumstances, whereas involuntary intoxication only attempts to rectify the
mental state of the accused.256 Justice Rice also noted that involuntary intoxication (under the umbrella of automatism) has not yet been codified in
Montana, while compulsion has.257 Finally, Justice Rice expressed concern
that the Court’s holding will unnecessarily complicate the prosecution of
DUI charges by giving rise to “pretextual defenses” that waste time and
frustrate the State’s attempts to curtail drunk driving.258
The Montana Practitioner should be aware that Paffhausen potentially
weakens the meaning of “absolute liability” under Montana law. It makes
automatism a judicially recognized defense that is available not only to
challenge the mental state element but to challenge the voluntary act element of an offense as well. The decision immediately impacts the prosecution of DUI cases with potentially positive and negative consequences. On
249. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 151–152 (Rice, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 152 (citing to Annotator’s Note, Mont. Crim. Code of 1973, Annotated at 90 (1973 ed.)).
251. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 152.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 154–155, 156.
254. N.M. v. Gurule, 252 P.3d 823 (N.M. App. 2011).
255. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 154–155. “Duress” functions similarly to compulsion in that it “is
available as a defense when the defendant committed the prescribed act, with the requisite intent, in
order to avoid a harm of greater magnitude.” Id. at 155 (quoting Gurule, 252 P.3d at 829).
256. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 155 (quoting Gurule, 252 P.3d at 829).
257. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d at 155.
258. Id. at 156.
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the one hand, persons charged with DUI after they have been unwittingly
drugged may receive more just results if they can show they did not act
voluntarily. However, Justice Rice’s concerns about the erosion of absolute
liability and negative effects on the State’s attempts to control drunk driving
are valid because of the broad scope of the Court’s ruling. Not only does
Paffhausen open the door to involuntary intoxication defenses against DUI,
the decision could also serve as precedent to apply automatism defenses to
other absolute liability crimes in the future.
—Russell Michaels
VIII.

DONALDSON V. STATE259

In Donaldson v. State, the plaintiffs asked the Montana Supreme Court
to find that Montana’s statutory scheme unconstitutionally prevented samesex couples from enjoying benefits that opposite-sex couples enjoy.260 The
Court upheld the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims—that a
particular statutory scheme denied them rights guaranteed by the Montana
Constitution because they were in same-sex relationships261—on the basis
that such a broad determination was beyond the scope of the judiciary’s
power, would be speculative, and would not resolve an actual controversy.262 According to the Court, the Declaratory Judgments Act does not
give Montana courts the power to determine matters of this nature.263
The plaintiffs were twelve individuals in committed same-sex relationships.264 In 2010, they sued the State, arguing the statutory structure prevents them from enjoying the same relationship and family obligations and
protections that similarly situated different-sex couples enjoy.265 The plaintiffs argued this statutory structure is unconstitutional because it interferes
with their rights to equal protection, due process, privacy, dignity, and pursuit of life’s necessities, which are guaranteed under Article II of the Montana Constitution.266 They sought both a declaration that the current statutory scheme denies them Article II rights and an injunction prohibiting the
State from continuing to deny them access under the statutory scheme.267
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 365–366.
Id.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 366–367.
Id. at 377.
Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 365.
Id.
Id.
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The plaintiffs did not seek the opportunity to marry or receive marriage
designations for their relationships.268
The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that,
as the plaintiffs did not challenge specific statutes, the relief sought would
require ordering a new statutory scheme, which would violate the separation of powers.269 According to the court, the proper method of litigating
the plaintiffs’ concerns would be specific suits directed at specifically identified statutes.270 Additionally, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to
alter or amend their complaint.271
On appeal, the plaintiffs reasserted their request for declaratory and
injunctive relief, arguing their constitutional challenges should be assessed
under a strict level of review and that, even under a low level of scrutiny,
the State could not show a legitimate government interest in the current
statutory scheme.272 The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the district
court’s assessment that granting such broad declaratory and injunctive relief
was beyond the judiciary’s power.273 The Court noted the requested relief
was so broad that granting it would not solve the controversy but would
instead lead to confusion and further litigation.274 It also bluntly declared,
“Courts do not function, even under the Declaratory Judgments Act, to determine speculative matters, to enter anticipatory judgments, to declare social status, to give advisory opinions or to give abstract opinions.”275
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ claims, stating the plaintiffs should have been given the opportunity to amend their complaint by listing specific statutes and developing
arguments about the nature of the State’s interest in these statutes and what
level of constitutional scrutiny the courts should apply.276 Accordingly, the
Court remanded the case with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint.277
Justice Rice wrote a concurring opinion, arguing the Marriage Amendment to the Montana Constitution provided another basis for dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ complaint.278 He argued, “The question thus posed by Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is whether the State is barred by the Constitu268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.; see Mont. Const. art. III, § 1.
Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 366.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366–367.
Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 367.
Id.
Id. at 368 (Rice, J., concurring).
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tion from using marriage as an exclusive basis for granting any concrete
legal entitlement.”279 Justice Rice contended the historical exclusive reservation of marriage and its corresponding benefits and obligations to different-sex couples prevented the plaintiffs from being similarly situated, provided a compelling state interest, and defeated their basis for an equal protection claim.280 According to Justice Rice, to decide otherwise would
render the Marriage Amendment superfluous.281
In his dissent, Justice Nelson took issue with the Court’s refusal to
adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act.282 The purpose of the Act “is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations;
and it is to be liberally construed and administered.”283 Declaratory relief is
appropriate, Justice Nelson contended, in situations where an actual controversy exists and no specific injury has yet taken place, but where it is nonetheless necessary to have the issue speedily determined because the delay of
ordinary judicial proceedings could result in injury to the parties.284
Referring to their Prayer for Relief, Justice Nelson noted the plaintiffs’
first five paragraphs sought a declaration that the State’s exclusion of samesex couples from the protections and obligations available to different-sex
couples violated five rights they held under the Montana Constitution.285
The next two paragraphs sought injunctive relief, requesting the State be
enjoined from preventing same-sex couples from having access to a statutory structure that provides them equal protection and the State be required
to offer them a statutory structure granting these protections and obligations.286 Justice Nelson pointed out that, in deciding the issue was nonjusticiable, the district court focused solely on whether the injunctive relief requested could be granted.287 Further, the district court did not know what
specific statutes would be affected by such a decision and determined that
issuing an injunction ordering the Legislature to alter them would be an
inappropriate exercise of judicial power.288 Therefore, Justice Nelson
agreed with the district court’s decision declining to order injunctive relief,
279. Id.
280. Id. at 372–374.
281. Id. at 374.
282. Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 391 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
283. Mont. Code. Ann. § 27–8–102 (2011).
284. Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 385 (citing Automation Sys., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 345, 347
(S.D. Iowa 1980)).
285. Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 386.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 386–387.
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but he stated its reasons for doing so should not have prevented it from
issuing declaratory relief.289
Justice Nelson went on to note that the majority also failed to differentiate between the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.290
He contended the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief raised the justiciable question of whether it is “constitutionally permissible for the State to
deny same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the benefits and protections made available to different-sex couples.”291 This controversy could
be resolved, Justice Nelson argued, through a declaration that sexual orientation is a suspect class and laws that provide disparate treatment between
same-sex couples and different-sex couples should be subjected to strict
scrutiny review.292 Nor would issuing declaratory relief be speculative, he
contended, because there was no denial the plaintiffs had suffered discrimination or they were being treated differently than similarly situated different-sex couples under Montana law.293
Under Secret Grand Jury Inquiry,294 Justice Nelson noted, the test the
Court previously used for determining whether a justiciable controversy exists for the purpose of issuing a declaratory judgment is: 1) whether “the
parties have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights
or interests”; 2) whether the controversy is one “upon which the judgment
of the court may effectively operate, as opposed to a debate resulting in a
purely political, administrative, philosophical, or academic conclusion”;
and 3) whether judicial determination will have the effect of a final judgment on the rights, status, or legal relationships of one or more of the parties involved or in the absence of this be of such overriding public importance as to constitute their legal equivalent.295 The plaintiffs’ request satisfied this test, Justice Nelson contended, because the rights the plaintiffs
invoked were existing and genuine rights as opposed to theoretical ones.296
The Court could settle the issue by making a judgment on whether the State
could offer certain benefits to different-sex couples but deny them to samesex couples.297 Finally, according to Justice Nelson, a judgment stating
what legal obligations and benefits same-sex couples are entitled to would
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 387.
Id. at 389.
Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 389–390.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Secret Grand Jury Inquiry, 553 P.2d 987, 990 (Mont. 1976).
Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 390 (citing Secret Grand Jury Inquiry, 553 P.2d at 990).
Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 390–391.
Id. at 391.
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determine the constitutional rights, status, and legal relationships of the parties.298
In light of Donaldson, the Montana practitioner should be aware that
claims seeking determination of the constitutionality of laws generally must
reference particular statutes, as opposed to statutory schemes, in order to be
considered justiciable. This will allow the courts to assess the nature of the
State’s interest and decide what level of judicial scrutiny should be applied
to each statute. While a failure to do so is unlikely to be fatal to the complaint due to the subsequent opportunity to amend, practitioners will want
to compose the complaint correctly the first time, rather than rely upon the
court’s generosity.
—Kathleen Molsberry
IX.

NORTHERN PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL, INC. V. MONTANA BOARD
OF LAND COMMISSIONERS299

In Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Montana Board of Land
Commissioners, the Montana Supreme Court held the State can enter into
coal leases without first conducting an environmental impact study (“EIS”)
because the studies are merely deferred until the permitting stage.300 Additionally, the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to the EIS exception at
issue because it concluded the act of issuing leases did not interfere with the
right to a clean and healthful environment under Article II, section 3 of the
Montana Constitution.301
The suit commenced when the Northern Plains Resource Council, the
National Wildlife Federation, the Montana Environmental Information
Center, and the Sierra Club (collectively “NPRC”) sought declaratory rulings that the State Land Board wrongfully neglected to perform environmental studies before entering into mining leases with Arch Coal in March
2010, which covered lands in the Otter Creek drainage.302 The leases at
issue provide that mining activity cannot commence until Arch Coal acquires all the mandatory permits from the State.303 Moreover, the State can
rescind the leases if Arch Coal fails to meet its obligations.304 During the
proceedings, both parties agreed coal mining and burning could increase the
carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere and thus “exacerbate global warm298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
N. Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Land Commrs., 288 P.3d 169 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 172.
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ing and climate change.”305 Ultimately, the district court granted the
State’s summary judgment motion by concluding, “Arch Coal, by leasing
the Otter Creek tracts from the State, acquired ‘nothing more than the exclusive right to apply for permits from the State.’”306 The district court
reasoned the requisite environmental reviews would occur prior to any actual coal mining or burning, and therefore, the State would still “meet its
constitutional and trust responsibilities, both environmentally and financially.”307
After NPRC appealed, the State maintained that environmental review
will occur before Arch Coal obtains the requisite permits and begins mining.308 The State relied on Montana Code Annotated § 77–1–121(2), which
excuses the State Land Board from conducting an EIS prior to issuing a
lease.309 Essentially, the statute “defer[s] preparation of an environmental
impact statement (EIS) until later in the development process.”310
NPRC contended that coal mining and its subsequent burning cause
detrimental effects such as pollution and global warming.311 Therefore,
NPRC argued § 77–1–121(2) is unconstitutional because the Montana Constitution requires the State to regulate activities that can affect citizens’ right
to a clean and healthful environment.312 In essence, NPRC contended that
without the § 77–1–121(2) exception, the State Land Board would have
been compelled to perform an EIS before awarding the coal leases.313 Additionally, NPRC argued that because § 77–1–121(2) impacts the right to a
clean environment under the Montana Constitution, the statute must survive
strict scrutiny.314
The Montana Supreme Court framed the issue as “whether the State
Land Board properly issued leases . . . without first conducting environmental review under the Montana Environmental Policy Act.”315 The Court
began its analysis by noting that the Montana Constitution guarantees all
citizens the right to a clean and healthful environment.316 The Legislature
is responsible for administering this right and fulfills this duty through the
Montana Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”).317 MEPA “requires State
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

N. Plains Resource Council,
Id. at 171, 173.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.
N. Plains Resource Council,
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 173; Mont. Const. art.
N. Plains Resource Council,

Inc., 288 P.3d at 172.

Inc., 288 P.3d at 172.

II, § 3.
Inc., 288 P.3d at 173.
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agencies to review, through an EIS, major actions that significantly affect
the quality of the human environment so that the agencies may make informed decisions.”318 Citing North Fork Preservation Association v. Department of State Lands,319 the Court noted that merely granting oil and gas
leases does not significantly affect the environment because the State is not
bound to an “irretrievable commitment of resources” since permits must be
acquired before ground-disturbing activities commence.320 The Court further reasoned Arch Coal’s lease expressly prohibits the commencement of
mining before acquiring permits from the State, a process that includes conducting an EIS.321
Next, the Court turned to NPRC’s argument that the § 77–1–121(2)
exception must survive a strict scrutiny analysis.322 The Court cited MEIC
v. DEQ,323 where it held a statute that permitted the discharge of arsenictainted water without an EIS impacted the right to a clean environment and
thus forced the State to demonstrate a compelling interest.324 Distinguishing MEIC, the Court explained the Arch Coal leases do not circumvent the
EIS requirement, but only defer the reviews “from the leasing stage to the
permitting stage.”325 Thus, issuing the leases does not affect the fundamental right to a clean environment because the permitting process will eventually require an EIS.326 Accordingly, § 77–1–121(2) does not necessitate a
strict scrutiny analysis that requires the State to demonstrate a compelling
interest.327
After concluding no constitutional interests were implicated, the Court
held rational basis scrutiny applies to § 77–1–121(2).328 Holding
§ 77–1–121(2) satisfied rational basis review, the Court discussed the logic
behind deferring an EIS until the permitting stage, finding that deferring
“eliminate[s] duplicate and speculative studies and review, while preserving
all environmental protections required by law.”329 The Court then reiterated that a mining lease simply grants a company the exclusive right to
apply for a permit from the State, which will require the preparation of an
318.
319.
320.
862).
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
N. Fork Preservation Assn. v. Dept. of State Lands, 778 P.2d 862 (Mont. 1989).
N. Plains Resource Council, Inc., 288 P.3d at 174 (citing N. Fork Preservation Assn., 778 P.2d
N. Plains Resource Council, Inc., 288
Id.
MEIC v. DEQ, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont.
N. Plains Resource Council, Inc., 288
N. Plains Resource Council, Inc., 288
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174–175.
Id. at 175.
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EIS.330 Finally, the Court noted that the statute at issue generates significant income for the public school system, including a windfall of $85 million in the present case.331
Montana practitioners should take notice of Northern Plains because it
upholds the § 77–1–121(2) exception and extends it to coal leases, allowing
the State and operators to defer environmental studies until the permitting
stage. In sum, Northern Plains will limit litigation regarding environmental
impact statements during the leasing stage of natural resource development
on State lands.
—Jordan Peila
X.

CITY

OF

WHITEFISH V. JENTILE332

In City of Whitefish v. Jentile, the Montana Supreme Court held that
pleading guilty to a criminal violation does not preclude a defendant from
invoking the defense of comparative negligence in a restitution proceeding.333 In determining restitution, a court must consider the alleged negligence of other parties, including police officers pursuing a fleeing suspect.334 Jentile demonstrates that although the imposition of restitution is
required when a convicted criminal offender’s conduct results in loss to a
victim,335 the fact that loss resulted from the criminal offender’s conduct
does not automatically make the offender responsible for the entire loss—
the negligence of all parties involved must be balanced.336
On October 28, 2009, the Helena Veteran’s Administration (“VA”)
called the Whitefish Police Department (“Police”) to report concerns that
Ralph Jentile (“Jentile”), a VA client, might be suicidal.337 The VA stated
Jentile called asking questions about the lethality of lithium and the lack of
an antidote.338 Officer Ryan Zebro called Jentile and explained that he
needed to turn himself in because the VA ordered an evaluation for him.339
Jentile refused to turn himself in and stated he was not suicidal and wanted
to be left alone.340 The Police issued an “attempt to locate” for Jentile after
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
N. Plains Resource Council, Inc., 288 P.3d at 171, 175.
City of Whitefish v. Jentile, 285 P.3d 515 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 518, 520.
Id. at 520.
Mont. Code. Ann. § 46–18–201(5) (2011).
Jentile, 285 P.3d at 520.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id. at 517.
Id.
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failing to find him at his residence during two separate welfare checks.341
Shortly after the alert was issued, an officer reported seeing Jentile’s vehicle
driving through town.342
Three patrol cars stopped Jentile.343 One unit blocked traffic while a
second car pulled alongside Jentile and a third stopped behind him.344
Though Jentile initially stopped, he pulled back into traffic before officers
could get out of their vehicles, and the three patrol cars followed.345 The
vehicles sped through a 25 mile-per-hour zone at an estimated 45–50 miles
per hour.346 Jentile turned left onto a side street in a residential zone and
then made another immediate left turn into his own driveway.347 The first
patrol car was able to stop several feet behind Jentile’s vehicle but was
immediately rear-ended by Officer Zebro.348 Jentile was tasered as he exited his vehicle, handcuffed, and transported to the hospital for a mental
health evaluation.349
The Montana Highway Patrol (“MHP”) investigated the crash and issued a report concluding that Officer Zebro following too closely caused
the crash.350 No citations were issued to Officer Zebro, but a letter of reprimand was placed in his file.351
The county attorney charged Jentile with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and eluding a peace officer, all misdemeanors.352 The City of Whitefish (“City”) requested restitution for the damage to both police cars.353
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jentile pled guilty to eluding a police officer,
and the remaining two charges were dropped.354 The plea agreement allowed for a restitution hearing to be held separate from the sentencing.355
Jentile moved to dismiss the restitution hearing, arguing he should not
have to pay for damage to the patrol cars.356 To support his claim that he
did not cause the accident, Jentile cited the MHP report finding Officer
Zebro to be at fault for following too closely.357 Jentile also argued the
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id.
Jentile, 285 P.3d at 517.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jentile, 285 P.3d at 517.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jentile, 285 P.3d at 517.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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City was wrongfully involved in a civil matter and violated its own policies
by initiating a pursuit of Jentile’s vehicle.358 The motion was denied, and a
restitution hearing was held in municipal court.359 At the hearing, Jentile
argued that the Police were negligent per se for pursuing him though he was
not under arrest, for not conducting the pursuit in a safe manner, and for not
discontinuing the pursuit.360 Jentile also argued the City was negligent per
se for not adopting the Montana Law Enforcement Training Center’s suggested policies for dealing with persons with mental disorders.361
The municipal court awarded the City’s request for restitution and ordered Jentile to pay $7,327.81.362 It found the collision to be “a direct consequence of Jentile’s erratic unlawful driving that required defensive, reactive, emergency maneuvering by police in visual pursuit.”363 Jentile first
appealed to the district court, which also rejected Jentile’s claims and affirmed the municipal court’s ruling, before appealing to the Montana Supreme Court.364
On appeal, Jentile argued that eluding a police officer does not preclude a comparative negligence analysis and that the restitution amount was
reached in error because the municipal court failed to take into consideration Officer Zebro’s alleged negligence.365 The City argued the accident
was caused by Jentile’s illegal conduct rather than any negligence on the
part of the officers.366 It further argued that even if a comparative negligence analysis should be allowed in a criminal restitution hearing, Jentile
waived the defense by failing to raise it at the hearing.367
The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the municipal
court for a comparative negligence determination in light of the statutes and
case law regarding emergency responders.368 The Court pointed out that
while Montana Code Annotated § 61–8–107 allows a police officer to exceed the speed limit or disregard other traffic laws when in pursuit or responding to an emergency call, it “does not relieve the officer from the duty
to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor does it protect the
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id.
Id.
Jentile, 285 P.3d at 517.
Id.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jentile, 285 P.3d at 518.
Id.
Id. at 518–519, 521.
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officer from the consequences of the officer’s reckless disregard for the
safety of others.”369
The Court also rejected the City’s argument that Jentile waived the
defense of comparative negligence by failing to raise it at the hearing.370
The Court noted that although Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), cited
by the City for support, requires an affirmative defense to be raised in the
answer or be deemed waived, a restitution hearing for a criminal case does
not require an answer.371 Montana Code Annotated § 46–18–244(2) allows
a criminal defendant to “assert any defense that the offender could raise in a
civil action for the loss for which the victim seeks compensation.”372 Despite the fact that he never specifically stated the phrase “comparative negligence,” Jentile did present arguments regarding negligence per se on the
part of the City and Officer Zebro.373 The Court held these statements were
sufficient to raise the defense.374 Because comparative negligence merely
compares the negligence of the various parties, the municipal court should
have considered the alleged negligence on the part of the City and Officer
Zebro in making a determination on restitution.375
Justice Rice dissented.376 He agreed with the majority’s holding that a
comparative negligence analysis was appropriate and that Jentile’s statements regarding negligence per se were sufficient to raise the defense.377
However, Justice Rice took issue with the majority’s ultimate conclusion
that the municipal court, and the district court on appeal, did not do such an
analysis.378
A lower court’s findings of fact regarding restitution are reviewed for
clear error.379 Justice Rice noted that the municipal court reviewed briefs
on Jentile’s motion to dismiss, heard opening and closing arguments from
both sides, reviewed the video of the pursuit and crash, and heard testimony
from Officer Zebro and Jentile.380 After consideration of all this, the municipal court determined “the entire pursuit ‘was an unbroken course of
369. Id. at 519 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–107; Stenberg v. Neel, 613 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Mont.
1980); Elklund v. Trost, 151 P.3d 870, 879 (Mont. 2006)).
370. Jentile, 285 P.3d at 519.
371. Id.
372. Id. (citing Mont. Code. Ann. § 46–18–244(2)).
373. Jentile, 285 P.3d at 517, 519.
374. Id. at 519.
375. Id. at 519–520.
376. Id. at 521.
377. Id. at 521 (Rice, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 521–522.
379. Jentile, 285 P.3d at 518 (citing State v. Johnson, 265 P.3d 638, 641 (Mont. 2011) (internal
citations omitted)).
380. Jentile, 285 P.3d at 522.
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events that was caused by Jentile’s unlawful conduct.’”381 It further determined that the officers had acted reasonably and in a “controlled way,” and
the accident was “a direct consequence of Jentile’s erratic unlawful driving.”382 The order clearly noted that after consideration of Jentile’s “civil
law defenses,” none of them “would bar the imposition of a full measure of
restitution.”383 Justice Rice would have affirmed the municipal court’s decision on the amount of restitution.384 In his opinion, Justice Rice pointed
out that the Court’s disagreement with the municipal court’s factual findings “essentially directs a ‘verdict’ in favor of Jentile.”385
Montana practitioners should be aware that in a criminal restitution
proceeding, a convicted defendant has the right to raise the defense of comparative negligence. An admitted violation of the law, on its own, does not
subject the defendant to sole responsibility for loss associated with his or
her conduct. Jentile also suggests that a “but-for” test regarding the defendant’s actions is inappropriate when there is alleged negligence on the part
of others.
—Fallon Stanton
XI.

STATE V. COOKSEY386

In State v. Cooksey, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s conviction of Defendant Bobby Cooksey for deliberate homicide.387
In doing so, the Court determined Montana Code Annotated § 45–3–112
does not require law enforcement to conduct an independent investigation
into every justifiable use of force situation; rather, law enforcement must
merely make available for disclosure to the defense any evidence supporting a justifiable use of force defense that arises during an investigation.388
Justice Nelson dissented from this portion of the Court’s decision, stating
such a view “completely emasculates [the] statute.”389 Although the Court
addressed four issues on appeal,390 the Court’s disposition of the justifiable
381. Id. at 521.
382. Id. at 523.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. State v. Cooksey, 286 P.3d 1174 (Mont. 2012).
387. Id. at 1176.
388. Id. at 1181.
389. Id. at 1183 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Nelson also dissented
from the Court’s determination that Cooksey failed to raise credible concerns regarding possible taint of
the jury pool under the first issue. Justice Rice joined Justice Nelson’s dissent as to the Court’s opinion
regarding the justifiable use of force statute.
390. Id. at 1176 (majority).
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use of force issue will have the greatest impact on the practice of law in
Montana.
Bobby Cooksey lived next to Tracey Beardslee outside of Roundup,
Montana.391 The only way Beardslee accessed his property was via a road
easement across Cooksey’s property.392 During the several years Beardslee
lived there, the two men had several verbal arguments.393 On July 7, 2009,
Cooksey alleged he heard his dogs barking and left his house armed with a
large-bore, lever-action rifle.394 He saw Beardslee clearing weeds along the
edges of the easement with a weed-whacker.395 Cooksey approached
Beardslee and asked him what he was doing on Cooksey’s property.396 According to Cooksey, Beardslee “went off” on him, threatening him and ultimately saying he would kill Cooksey.397 Using his rifle, Cooksey shot
Beardslee in the chest, killing him.398 Cooksey then returned to his house
and called 911, reporting that he had shot Beardslee.399
Beardslee never physically attacked Cooksey.400 When the incident
occurred, a fence stood between the two men, and Beardslee was moving
away toward his home.401 Although Cooksey saw Beardslee had a folding
knife on his belt, Cooksey never saw him pull it out.402 Officers ultimately
investigated the relationship between Cooksey and Beardslee, reviewed
Cooksey’s version of Beardslee’s actions on the day in question, and obtained an analysis of Beardslee’s blood.403
A jury in the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Musselshell County,
convicted Cooksey of deliberate homicide, and the district court sentenced
him to fifty years in the Montana State Prison.404 The most notable issue
raised by Cooksey on appeal was whether the State improperly failed to
investigate evidence surrounding his defense of justifiable use of force.405
Along these lines, Cooksey argued the district court’s exclusion of evidence
regarding the presence of anti-depressants in Beardslee’s blood prevented
him from presenting this defense.406
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id.
Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1176.
Id.
Id. at 1179.
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Cooksey contended the district court improperly excluded the defense’s offered evidence concerning the presence of the drug Paxil in
Beardslee’s blood, which the defense believed could be linked to Beardslee’s aggressive behavior.407 The Court held the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it excluded this evidence on the grounds that the defense
failed to disclose it to the prosecution in violation of § 46–15–323(5) and
failed to show good cause for not doing so.408
The Court also addressed the proper interpretation of § 45–3–112, the
statute governing the investigation of alleged offenses involving claims of
justifiable use of force.409 Section 45–3–112 provides:
When an investigation is conducted by a peace officer of an incident that
appears to have or is alleged to have involved the justifiable use of force, the
investigation must be conducted so as to disclose all evidence, including testimony concerning the alleged offense and that might support the apparent or
alleged justifiable use of force.410

Initially, the district court “refused to construe [the statute] to impose any
new and independent duty for law enforcement to investigate cases involving justifiable use of force.”411 Rather, the district court equated the statute
with the long-established Brady disclosure, which requires the prosecution
to disclose any exculpatory evidence to the defense.412 According to the
district court, the statute only creates an obligation “to conduct a thorough
investigation, which may or may not include issues regarding self defense
[sic]. If [investigators] do gather evidence that is potentially exculpatory, or
supports the affirmative defense of self-defense, then they [have] a duty to
disclose it to the defense.”413
Cooksey contended law enforcement admitted to doing “nothing” to
investigate his self-defense claim in violation of the statute, and thus
Beardslee’s Paxil use was not uncovered until a month before the trial, resulting in its exclusion by the district court.414 However, the Court agreed
with the district court’s construction, holding the statutory language is
“plain and clear on its face.”415 The Court explained that Cooksey failed to
demonstrate that it required law enforcement to conduct an independent investigation regarding his self-defense claim or that any actual or potential
evidence was lost, withheld, or went undiscovered during the investiga407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1180–1181.
Mont. Code Ann. § 45–3–112 (2009).
Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1181.
Id. at 1180 (citing Brady v. Md., 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1181.
Id. at 1186 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1181 (majority).
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tion.416 The Court concluded the statute only requires that “evidence” that
would support the defense be made available for disclosure to the defendant
and that Cooksey failed to point to any evidence that would have supported
his defense that was not disclosed.417
Justice Nelson dissented from the Court’s holding as to this issue and
noted his disagreement with the Court in its application of the same statute
in its previous decision in State v. Mitchell.418 Justice Nelson began his
analysis by asserting the presumption that the legislature does not pass
meaningless or useless laws.419 Justice Nelson agreed with the majority
that § 45–3–112 is clear and unambiguous, and thus legislative intent may
be determined through the plain meaning of the words in the statute.420
However, Justice Nelson noted § 45–3–112 does not mention “prosecutors”
but rather refers specifically to “peace officers,” implying the statutory duties extend to both prosecutors and investigators.421 He further contended
these duties extend beyond the existing protections provided by the Brady
disclosure, noting the purpose of the statute “is to clarify and secure the
ability of people to protect themselves.”422 According to Justice Nelson,
interpreting it as merely reflecting existing protections would essentially
render it meaningless.423
Justice Nelson also addressed two additional arguments made by the
State: firstly, its contention that peace officers should not have a duty to
investigate on behalf of the defense; and secondly, that the remarks of two
senators during a 2009 subcommittee hearing regarding the justifiable use
of force language demonstrate the code provision was meant to be merely
duplicative of current law.424 As to the first, Justice Nelson noted that although the criminal justice system is based on an adversarial model, the
legislature has the ability to modify that system, and such a modification
could take the form of a statute requiring peace officers to assist the defendant with the investigation in cases involving justifiable use of force.425 As
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1183 (Nelson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see State v. Mitchell, 286 P.3d
1196 (Mont. 2012) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that law enforcement failed to properly investigate his justifiable use of force claim that the other individual reached for a potential weapon during the
confrontation).
419. Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1186–1187.
420. Id. at 1187
421. Id. at 1188.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 1190–1191.
425. Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1190.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/10

38

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-2\MON205.txt

unknown

Seq: 39

10-JUN-13

10:00

Law Review: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner

2013

LEGAL SHORTS

497

to the second, Justice Nelson maintained that the plain language of the statute controls over any conjectured meaning by a couple of senators.426
Justice Nelson, however, did not contend the statute imposes an affirmative obligation to commence an investigation (as argued by Cooksey
and Mitchell), but it dictates that when a peace officer conducts an investigation and questions regarding justifiable use of force arise, § 45–3–112
imposes a duty to conduct the investigation in a particular manner.427 As
such, the statute requires “the peace officer to conduct his investigation so
as to expose or make known ‘all’ evidence—including evidence that the
State has not yet uncovered and does not yet have in its possession.”428
Justice Nelson ultimately determined the statute was triggered in both
Cooksey and Mitchell and was violated in both cases.429 Regarding Cooksey, Justice Nelson specifically noted the investigators’ admission to making “no effort at all” to investigate Cooksey’s claim.430
Ultimately, Montana practitioners should take note of Cooksey as it
clearly demonstrates § 45–3–112 merely requires peace officers to comply
with previously existing disclosure obligations.431 However, Justice Nelson’s dissent raises serious concerns regarding whether fact situations falling outside Brady disclosure protections may trigger a violation of the statute and what the proper remedy will be if and when a court finds such a
violation has occurred.432
—Samantha Stephens
XII.

PASTIMES, LLC V. CLAVIN433

In Pastimes, LLC v. Clavin, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
value of the Estate of Lila M. Clavin’s interest in Pastimes, LLC was properly valued as of the date of trial rather than the date of her death.434 Specifically, the Court determined the Estate had member rights under Montana
Code Annotated § 35–8–803(10) and the parties properly executed an oral
modification to Pastimes’s Operating Agreement (“Agreement”). Based on
the finding about the oral modification, the Court determined there was
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id. at 1191–1192.
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1189 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1193–1194.
Id. at 1193 (emphasis in original).
Cooksey, 286 P.3d at 1181 (majority).
Id. at 1194–1195 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Pastimes, LLC v. Clavin, 274 P.3d 714 (Mont. 2012), reh’g denied (Apr. 10, 2012).
Id. at 719.
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nothing in the Montana Limited Liability Act (the “Act”) that automatically
dissociated “the Estate upon Lila’s death”.435
Robert Gilbert (“Robert”) and Lila Clavin (“Lila”) founded Pastimes,
LLC (“Pastimes”) in July 1996 and executed the Agreement in August
1996.436 The Agreement identified Robert and Lila as the only members,
each holding 50 percent ownership interest in the company.437 Furthermore, it stated that “Pastimes shall terminate ‘upon the death, retirement,
resignation, bankruptcy, court declaration of incompetence with respect to,
or dissolution of, a Member,’ unless at least two members remain who
agree to continue the business of Pastimes.”438 Lila died on November 1,
2000.439 Her son, Tim Clavin (“Tim”), was the personal representative of
the Estate of Lila M. Clavin (the “Estate”).440 Robert and Tim could not
agree on the value of Lila’s share in Pastimes so Robert continued to run
the business while the valuation issue was determined.441 Robert has run
the business since Lila’s death.442 Additionally, Robert provided notice that
Lila’s 50 percent interest in Pastimes (and thus her 50 percent interest in its
liquor license) had been transferred to the Estate, and Robert charged 50
percent of Pastimes’s tax liability to the Estate each year.443
In 2005, Robert filed a complaint for declaratory relief requesting that
the district court determine the value of Lila’s share as of the date of her
death.444 In 2007, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment;
both parties, in effect, requested the court to declare the status of Pastimes
either as a partnership or a limited liability company.445 Without ruling on
the cross-motions, the district court ruled that the Estate should be awarded
more than Lila’s original investment.446 The valuation issue was argued on
February 17, 2009, and the court determined that Lila’s interest should be
based on “present-day” value.447
Not until trial in January of 2010 did the district court rule that Pastimes was “at all times” a limited liability company.448 But, the court found
that the Estate did not dissociate from Pastimes at the time of Lila’s
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Id. at 718.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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death.449 Additionally, the court found: (1) Lila and Robert each owned 50
percent of Pastimes;450 (2) the methods by which Pastimes’s assets were to
be distributed under the Agreement supported present-day valuation;451 and
(3) Robert and Tim continued to operate Pastimes so they could each get a
“return on their investments.”452 Based on these findings, the court concluded that the valuation issue was not governed by the Agreement and
should be determined by present-day value.453
Robert did not provide an independent opinion regarding Pastimes’s
present-day value, arguing that he could only provide an opinion of the
value at the time of Lila’s death.454 Thus, the district court adopted the
valuation of the Estate’s expert—$682,442.00.455 Although the court recognized Robert’s contributions to Pastimes after Lila’s death, the court also
observed that Lila and Robert co-founded the company, and “without Lila’s
initial contribution to the business it would not be in existence today.”456
Moreover, the court explained that Robert escaped nearly a decade of partial tax liability by attributing 50 percent of the income tax to the Estate.457
Pastimes appealed.458
On appeal, Pastimes argued the district court erred when it determined
the Agreement did not control the valuation date.459 Pastimes also argued
that Lila’s member interest was an estate asset and urged the Court to adopt
the reasoning in In re Estate of Snyder,460 which held that the value of
estate assets should be determined as of the date of the decedent’s death.461
The Montana Supreme Court construed Robert and Tim’s arrangement to
continue running the business as an oral modification to the Agreement and
agreed with the district court that the dissolution provision of the Agreement no longer applied.462 Furthermore, the Court stated that Snyder interpreted the probate code and did not apply to the issue in this case—business
valuation.463 Instead, the Court determined this was a matter of contract
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Id. at 716–717.
Id. at 717.
Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 717.
Id.
Id. at 718.
In re Estate of Snyder, 162 P.3d 87 (Mont. 2007).
Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 718 (citing Snyder, 162 P.3d at 94).
Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 717–719.
Id. at 718.
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interpretation, and the Agreement must be interpreted according to the statutes governing limited liability companies.464
The Court analyzed the Agreement under the limited liability company
statutes465 and the statutory and common law of contracts and affirmed the
district court on the issue of present-day valuation. Specifically, the Court
held that the Agreement no longer governed valuation due to an oral modification made after Lila’s death.466 As evidence of the modification, the
Court looked to the following facts: (1) Pastimes was not liquidated upon
Lila’s death; (2) the Estate forwent a payout in 2001 “in order to wait for a
potentially higher return on Lila’s initial investment”; and (3) Robert continued to manage Pastimes.467 Based on these facts and the Court’s conclusion that the parties orally modified the Agreement, the Court affirmed the
district court on the valuation issue.468
Notably, the Court held the oral modifications only related to the valuation of Pastimes and reversed the district court’s ruling regarding the rate
of interest to which the Estate is entitled.469 Additionally, the Court reversed the district court on the two remaining issues before it: (1) the Estate
was not entitled to attorney’s fees, either under the Agreement or under any
statutory provision;470 and (2) the Estate was not entitled to costs.471
Ultimately, in Pastimes, the Montana Supreme Court appears to have
construed § 35–8–803(10) in a way that divests § 35–8–803(8) of any real
meaning. The decision also grants the same member rights to the deceased
member’s estate as the member had in life, which, at a minimum, includes
the right to amend an operating agreement. Consequently, some of the protections and convenience sought by people forming LLCs (especially over
other forms of companies) may not be as strong as assumed. As such,
Montana practitioners must be vigilant when forming LLCs and drafting
464. Id.
465. Montana Code Annotated § 35–8–803(8)(a) provides that an individual member of an LLC is
dissociated upon her death. The statutes further provide that a member’s right to participate in “the
management and conduct of the company” terminates upon her dissociation. Mont. Code Ann.
§ 35–8–805(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to reach the conclusion that “members” could orally
modify the Agreement, the Court had to conclude that Lila did not dissociate upon her death despite the
plain language of the statute to the contrary. The Court found support for that conclusion in
§ 35–8–803(10), Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 718, which provides that “a member that is an estate or is acting
as a member by virtue of being a personal representative of an estate [dissociates upon] distribution of
the estate’s entire rights to receive distributions from the company.” Mont. Code Ann. § 35–8–803(10).
In this instance it appears that the Court substituted the Estate for Lila Clavin, individually, to bypass the
provisions of § 35–8–803(8).
466. Pastimes, 274 P.3d at 718.
467. Id. at 718–719.
468. Id. at 719.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 719–720.
471. Id.
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operating agreements to make certain the members’ intentions concerning
dissociation and dissolution are clear and not susceptible to judicial interpretation.
—Michelle Vanisko
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